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cause of the accident." The language used by the 
its comments was unfortunate, but since the law was clear 
and correctly stated in the instruction and the ju was 
accurately instructed elsewhere on the subject 0 roximate 
cause and contributory lwg-ligencp, we are Isfi!'d that no 
miscarriage of justice resu]t!:'d. (Cal.Con ., art. VI, § 4th.) 
Thr other claims of !:'rror made b' efendlmts are wholly 
without m!:')'it and n!:'rd not be d' 
Thr jlld,:rnJ!:'J1t is affirmrd. 
Sh!:'nk, J., Edmo s, .1., Cartrr, .1., TrarlloJ' .• T., Schaner, 
.J., and Spence ., concurred. 
[L. A. Ko. 22418. In Bank. Oct. 31, 1952.] 
ROBERT J. KEIDATZ et al., Appellants, v. LOUIS J. 
ALBANY et al., Respondents. 
[lJ Judgments-Res Judicata-Judgment on Demurrer.-A judg-
ment entered after sustaining a general demurrer is a judg-
ment on the merits to the extent that it adjudicates that the 
facts alleged do not constitute a cause of action, and will, 
accordingly, be a bar to a subsequent action alleging the same 
facts. 
[2J ld.-Res Judicata-Judgment on Demurrer.-Even though 
different facts may be alleged in a second action, if a general 
demurrer was sustained in the first action on a ground equally 
applicable to the second, the former judgment on such de-
murrer will be a bar to the second action. 
[SJ ld.-Res Judicata-Judgment on Demurrer.-If new or addi-
tional facts are alleged in a second action which cure defects 
in the original pleading, the former judgment on a general 
demurrer is not a bar to the subsequent action, whether or 
not plaintiff had an opportunity to amend his complaint. 
[4] ld.-Res Judicata-Judgment on Demurrer.-A judgment en-
tered on demurrer in action by purchasers against vendors of 
realty for rescission of contract of sale is not res judicata 
in subsequent action by purchasers for damages for fraudulent 
representations of such vendors, where the complaint in the 
first action did not allege that the property was worth less 
[1] Conclusiveness of judgment 011 demurrer, notes, 13 A.L.R. 
1104; 106 A.L.R. 437. See, also, Cal.Jur., Judgments, § 184; Am. 
Jur., Pleading, § 251 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-5] Judgments, § 352. 
) 
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than the price agreed to be paid therefor (Civ. Code, § 3343), 
and hence did not state a cause of action for damages for fraud. 
[5] Id.-Res Judicata-Judgment on Demurrer.-Although a judg-
ment in rescission action following a full trial on the merits 
is res judicata not only as to issues actually raised, but also 
as to issues that could have been raised in support of the 
action, a judgment entered on demurrer does not have such 
broad res judicata effect. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ven-
tura County. \\Talter J. Fourt, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages resulting from fraudulent representa-
tions in connection with sale of realty. Judgment for de-
fendants reversed. 
D. Wendell Reid for Appellants. 
"William T. Selby for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In this action to recover damages for fraud, 
plaintiffs alleged that they were induced to buy a newly-
constructed home from defendants by certain false and fraudu-
lent representations respecting the character of the construc-
tion of the house and its location on the described real prop-
erty. They further alleged that the representations were 
known by defendants to be false and were made to induce 
plaintiffs to purchase the property and that the contract price 
of $6,500 exceeded the value of the property by $3,000. In 
their answer defendants denied the allegations of fraud and 
pleaded affirmatively that plaintiffs' action was barred by two 
former adjudications between the parties. Defendants then 
made a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits 
setting out the following undisputed facts: in 1949, plaintiffs 
brought an action to rescind the contract for fraud and failure 
of consideration. A demurrer to the second amended com-
plaint was sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiffs failed to 
amend within the time allowed, and judgment was entered 
for defendants for costs. Thereafter plaintiffs unsuccessfully 
sought relief from the judgment under section 473 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. No appeal was taken, however, from 
the judgment or from the order denying relief under section 
473. Approximately four months after the judgment in the 
rescission action was entered, plaintiffs brought this action for 
) 
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damages for fraud. 'fhe trial court granted defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment and plaintiffs have appealed. 
Plaintiffs contend that their unsuccessful attempt to secure 
rescission of the. contract does not bar their present action 
for damal!('s for fraud. Defendants, on the other hand, con-
tend that th<> former judgment is res judicata of all issues 
presentpd here.f.· Since tlle former judgment was entered after 
a general demurrer had been sustained with leave to amend, 
it is necessary to determine the scope of the doctrine of res 
judicata in sueh circumstances. [1] The procedural effect 
of such a judgment appears to be sui getter-is. It is a judgment 
011 the llJerits to the extent that it adjudicates that the facts 
IIlleg!'d du not constitute a eallse of action, and will, accord-
ingly, be a bar to a subsequent action alleging the .same facts. 
(See Y. Joughin, 18 Ca1.2d 603, 606-609 [116 P.2d 777]; 
Godilard Y. Sec-llrity Title Ins. &- GlIar. Co., 14 Cal.2d 47, 52 
[92 P.2d 804] ; Fay Y. C"ags Lamd Co., 62 Cal.App.2d 445, 
448 (145 P.2d 46].) [2] Moreover, even though different 
facts ma~' be alleged in the second aetion, if the demurrer was 
sustained in the first action on a ground equally applicable 
to the seeond, the former judgment will also be a bar. (Rob-
inson Y. Howat'd, :> Cal. 428, 429; Goddard v. Seourity Title 
Ins. d' Guar. Co., .~lIpra.) [3] If, on the other hand, new 
or additional facts are alleged that cure the defects in the 
orig-inal pleading, it is settled that the former judgment is 
110t a bar to the subsequent actjon whether or not plaintiff 
had an opportunity to amend his complaint. (Goddard v. 
Security Title Ins. & Guar. Co., Sllpra.; Ncwh.all v. Hatch, 134 
Cal. 269, 272 [66 P. 266, 55 L.R.A. 673] ; Heilig v. Parlin, 134 
Cal. 99, 101-102 [66 P. 18] ; Morrell v. Morgan, 65 Cal. 575, 576-
577 [4 P. 580] ; City of Los Angeles v. Mellus, 59 Cal. 444, 453; 
Rose v. Ames, 68 Cal.App.2d 444, 448 [156 P.2d 953] ; Dynz.ent 
Y. Board of Me.dic.al Exarl/lin·ers, 93 Cal.App. 65, 71 [268 P. 
1073] ; Takekawa. v. Hol.e, 17 Cal.App. 653,656 [121 P. 296]; 
see See Y. JOllghin, 18 Cal.2d 603, 606 [116 P.2d 777] ; Cam-
pCT/ella v. Campenclla, 204 Cal. 515. 521 [269 P. 433] ; Erganian 
Y. Brightman, 13 Cal.App.2d 696, 700 (57 P.2d 971]; Re-
• After plaintiffs' unsuccessful attempt to rescind the contract, but 
before the present action was commenced, defendants purchased the 
property at a foreclosure sale under the deed of trust given to lIecure 
the purchase price, and recovered judgment by defa.ult for possession 
of the property. Defendants make no argument on this appeal, how· 
ever, that the summary judgment may be sustained on the basis of 
theBe faets. 
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statf'ment, Judgments, § 50, Comments c and e; 30 Cal.L.Rev. 
487; Anno., 106 A.L.R. 437, 444.) 
[4] In plaintiffs' first action they sought rescission of the 
contrad. In addition to alleging certain fraudulent representa-
tiOll>; wh('reby the~' were induceu to enter into the contract, 
they alleged that the:' had offered to restore everything of 
yalue they hall rpceiYf'd, and sought the return of the pay-
ment.s they had madl'. It appeared from the complaint, how-
ever, that the alleged defects in construction became apparent 
to plaintiffs over a year before they sought to rescind, and 
defendants successfully demurred on the ground that the 
action was barred by laches and by failure to rescind promptly. 
(See Civ. Code, § ]69]; Williams v. lIfn,rshall, 37 Cal.2d 445, 
455-456 [235 P .2d 372].) Whether or not the complaint 
st.ates a cause of action for rescission, the demurrer should 
have been overruled if a cause of action for damages 
was statf'd. (Banc1'oft Y. Woodward, ]83 Cal. 99, 102 [190 P. 
44;1]; lIlacIsaac v. Pozzo, 26 Cal. 2d 809, 815 [161 P.2d 449].) 
Plaintiffs' complaint did not, llOwever, allege that the prop-
erty was worth less than the price they agreed to pay 
for it (Civ. Code, § 3343), and accordingly, it did not state 
a rause of action for damag-es for fraud. (Davis v. Rite-Lite 
Sales Co .. 8 Cal.2d 675, 679 [67 P.2d 1039] ; G'utterman v. 
Golly, 13] Cal.App. 647, 65]-652 [21 P.2d 1000].) In the 
present artion, plaintiffs haw added this allegation that was 
absent from their fo1'111rr complaint, and accordingl:" under 
thf' rule hereinabove stated, the former judgment is not a 
bar to this action. 
[5] Deff'ndants contend however, that Wulfjen v. Dolton, 
24 Cal.2d 891 [15] P.2d 846], establishes the rule that a party 
rlaiming- to have been defrauded must seek all the relief 
to which he may be entitled in one action, and that he may 
not. after having failed in an action to rescind a contract 
for fraud, thereaftpr bring a spcond action for damages. In 
the Wnlfjen case. however, the judgment in the rescission 
at'tiOll had not been entered on demurrer, but had followed a 
full trial on thf' mprits. and the court applied the rule that 
such a judgment is res judicata not only as to issues actually 
raised, but as to issues that could have bepn raised in support 
of the action. (See Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Ca1.2d ] 95, 202 [99 
P.2d 6;)2, ]01 P.2d 497].) As has beE'n pointed out above. 
howrwr, it has bepn tIl{' settled rule in this state that a judg--
lJlf'llt entered on demurrpr does not have snch broad res 
judirllta effect. The rule respecting snch judgments is iUus-
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trative of the line that has been drawn beyond which a plaintiff 
may not go if he hopes thereafter to start again. It is analogous 
to the rule that was applicable to nOllsuits before section 581c 
was added to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1947. A judg-
ment of nonsuit was not on the merits, and a plaintiff could 
start anew and recover judgment if he could prove sufficient 
facts in the second action. (II erdan Y. Hanson, 182 Cal. 
538, 542 [l89 P. 440] ; Estate of Sharon, 179 Cal. 447, 461 
1]77 P. 283]; City & County of San P7'ancisco v. Brown, 153 
Cal. 644, 648 [96 P. 281].) Section 581e now provides that a 
judgment of nonsnit operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits unless the conrt otherwise specifies. J n view of the 
liheral rnlef; relating to amendments to the pleadings, it has 
h(,(,11 forcefully a(h-oeated that the same policy reflected in 
section 581c shonld apply to judgments on demurrer, and 
that a plaintiff should be required to set forth all the facts 
relating to his dispute in one action. (See McFarland, J., dis-
s('nting in Newhall Y. IIatch, 134 Cal. 269, 276 [66 P. 266, 
55 L.R.A. 673] ; Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 Yale L . 
• T. 299, 319-320; Clark on Code Pleading [2d ed.] § 84, 
p. 531; 30 Cal.L.Rey. 487, 490-491.) On the other hand less 
prejudice is suff('red by a defendant who has had only to 
attack the pleadings. than b~; one who has been forced to go 
to trial until a nonsuit is granted, and the hardship suffered 
by being forced to defend against a new action, instead of 
against an amended complaint, is not materially greater. (See 
Commerci,(J,l Centre R. Co. v. Superior Court. 7 Cal.2d 121, 
]29-130 [59 P.2d 978, 107 A.L.R. 714].) We do not feel, 
however. that at this time we should reweigh the conflicting 
argnments over the wisdom of the rule we apply. Since it is 
a settled rule of procedure upon which parties are entitled 
to rely in conducting their litigation, any change therein 
should be made by the Legislature and not by this court. 
Since the judgment must be reversed, it is unnecessary to 
decide whether it was proper in this ease for defendants to 
proceed by motion for summar~T judgment under section 
437c of the Code of Civil Procedure rather than under the 
provisions of section 597 of that code. 
The judgment is reyersed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, .J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and 
Spence. J., concurred. 
SclJaner. J., ('oncurrcd in the judgment. 
